Regulatory coherence: blending trade and regulatory policy by Peter Mumford
Policy Quarterly – Volume 10, Issue 4 – November 2014 – Page 3
Peter Mumford
Regulatory Coherence 
blending trade  
and regulatory  
policy
Regulatory coherence has over the past four years become a 
term of art for domestic regulatory systems which interface 
seamlessly with the systems of other countries. And yet a 
precise or at least agreed definition remains elusive and 
descriptions often confuse ends and means. This article sets 
out to provide greater clarity, and in doing so illustrates 
that regulatory coherence can be thought of as both an ‘end’ 
(regulation that supports international trade and investment) 
and a ‘means’ (good regulatory practice). The adoption by 
countries of regulatory coherence objectives and practices 
increasingly blends trade and domestic regulatory policy. 
‘Behind the border’ barriers – the new 
frontier for trade policy?
For those of us who have been involved 
in negotiating international agreements 
in areas as diverse as technical barriers 
to trade (TBTs), services regulation, 
intellectual property and competition 
policy, the idea that ‘behind the border 
barriers’ to trade is the new frontier 
for trade policy is unsurprising. What 
has been discussed and agreed in 
international forums has for a long time 
had implications for domestic regulatory 
policy settings. Notwithstanding this, 
there are now a large number of reports 
which highlight the importance of ‘behind 
the border’ regulatory barriers to trade, 
relative to ‘traditional’ barriers, and in 
particular tariffs. The following passage is 
representative:1
As much as 80 percent of the 
total potential gains from the 
TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership] would 
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come from cutting costs that arise 
from administrative procedures 
and divergent regulations (so-called 
non-tariff barriers or NTBs), as 
well as from liberalising trade in 
services and public procurement. 
Although tariffs between the US and 
the EU are already low (on average 
4 percent), the cost of dealing with 
unnecessary bureaucracy can add a 
tariff-equivalent of 10–20 percent to 
the price of goods. (Karmakar, 2013, 
p.2)
A number of factors are contributing 
to this ‘behind the border’ narrative, 
with two having particularly important 
effects. The first is that tariff barriers have 
come down very significantly for most 
traded goods in most major markets, 
which makes other barriers both more 
obvious and more material (constituting 
a relatively higher proportion of the 
cost of goods). The second is that the 
growth of both global value chains and 
services trade is exposing a broader 
range of domestic regulatory barriers. 
For example, occupational regulation is 
becoming a constraint on cross-border 
services exports, and international firms 
which operate in more than one country 
(the implication of locating different 
parts of the value chain in different 
countries) develop a keen interest in 
both the quality and ‘interoperability’ of 
domestic laws and institutions that affect 
both their global and domestic business 
operations. 
The practical implication of this 
is that firms, and those who represent 
business, are using their ‘voice’ to argue 
that more attention should be given to 
‘behind the border’ barriers to trade, 
or, to be absolutely clear, the effect of 
domestic regulation on global business 
operations, including value chains. In 
recent years this ‘voice’ has used the term 
‘regulatory coherence’ as an expression of 
what it wants.
There are concerns that this ‘business-
centric’ impetus will result in the 
interests of businesses, and in particular 
large international businesses, being put 
ahead of broader social, economic or 
environmental objectives in the design 
of new laws, and this ‘contrary voice’ 
has also expressed its concerns in the 
language of regulatory coherence (Kelsey, 
2013). Advocates for regulatory coherence 
have pushed back at this concern, arguing 
that the objective is efficient and effective 
regulation which is good for consumers 
as well as business, and neither the right 
of countries to regulate nor important 
objectives in areas such as health, safety 
and the environment will be compromised 
(Clancy, 2013). 
Are ‘behind the border barriers’ and 
their expression in the goal of regulatory 
coherence the new frontier of trade 
policy? There is certainly a view that this 
is the case. 
Regulatory coherence defined 
Regulatory coherence in a trade context 
is relatively recent. For example, prior to 
2010 the main references to it in Google 
Scholar, such as they were, were in the 
context of coherence between multiple 
levels of government (in federal systems) 
and ‘policy coherence’: for example, the 
alignment of domestic agencies and 
laws with a national regulatory reform 
objective. This changed in 2010–11, and 
the probable reason for this is that the 
term started to be used in relation to 
major trade negotiations, and in particular 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), and in international 
forums such as the Asia Pacific Economic 
Community (APEC). It is also used in the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities 
Act of 2014 which is currently before 
the United States Congress and which 
proposes a new set of negotiating objectives 
for the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA 
– the power granted to the US president 
to negotiate international agreements). If 
one assumes that the bill is a product of 
intensive engagement between multiple 
parties in Washington over a period of 
time (and which spill over into US trade 
discussions and forums such as APEC), 
then the increasing prominence of the 
term becomes explicable. 
However, within the literature 
on regulatory coherence the various 
descriptions are somewhat mixed. For 
example, there is a confusion of ‘ends’, such 
as lower regulatory costs for businesses 
operating across borders, and the means 
to achieve these ends, such as harmonised 
standards. In addition, some descriptions 
focus on cooperation between states to 
achieve regulatory coherence, and others 
on the improvement of regulation and 
regulatory processes within states. The 
following is an example that combines 
many of these elements:
Regulatory coherence is not about 
less regulation nor is it about more 
regulation. It is about improving the 
process by which APEC economies 
develop regulations, generate 
best practices, and find common 
acceptable standards and timings in 
which to implement them. It doesn’t 
require loss of regulatory power 
or sovereignty. It results in more 
effective regulation that does not 
distort markets. Regulatory coherence 
fosters an optimal regulatory 
environment that allows the market 
to be more open, competitive, and 
innovative. (National Center for 
APEC and APEC Business Advisory 
Council, 2012, p.1) 
With a view to providing clarity, New 
Zealand has articulated an outcome-based 
description which grounds regulatory 
coherence firmly at the interface between 
With a view to providing clarity, New Zealand 
has articulated an outcome-based description 
which grounds regulatory coherence firmly at 
the interface between domestic regulation and 
international trade and investment liberalisation.
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domestic regulation and international 
trade and investment liberalisation. In 
doing so, it reiterates that regulatory 
coherence is as much to do with what 
countries do internally, as what happens 
between countries.2
Regulatory coherence requires a 
multidimensional strategy that has the 
following interrelated elements: 
a. Coherence between domestic and 
international policy goals. When 
developing domestic regulatory 
policies that may have an impact on 
trade and investment, these impacts 
should be identified and taken into 
account as part of the policy process. 
b. Coherence between domestic laws 
and agencies. In situations where 
a number of domestic regulatory 
agencies all deal with the same trade 
or investment transaction – for 
example, a good or service that must 
comply with multiple laws and be 
dealt with by multiple regulatory 
agencies – a consistent and efficient 
approach is taken. 
c. Coherence between the laws and 
agencies of two or more economies. 
The third element is generally known 
as regulatory cooperation. It reflects 
the goal of reducing the regulatory 
barriers to trade and investment 
created by different laws in different 
countries through cooperation 
between economies. 
There are two main explanations 
for the apparent lack of ‘coherence’ in 
descriptions of regulatory coherence. 
The first is that different businesses have 
different experiences in the international 
trading environment, reflecting different 
markets, goods and services, and locations 
in value chains. One business might find 
that it has to deal with a lot of red tape in 
a market and would like fewer and more 
certain procedures. Another might find 
that its product is having to meet different 
standards in multiple markets and would 
like greater standardisation. Some may 
experience issues with border controls; 
others with migration requirements. 
Businesses, markets and regulatory 
regimes are highly heterogeneous, and 
hence so are the issues of concern to 
business. And business generally focuses 
on ends, not means.
The second reason emerges from 
public policy, or, to be specific, the public 
policy responses to the issues raised by 
business. Relative to business, public 
policy focuses as much on means as on 
ends, and in relation to ends has a broader 
set of objectives. For example, businesses 
may seek global standards, as this makes 
it easier for them to do business. Public 
policy must have regard to the broader 
purposes of standards, such as health, 
safety and environmental outcomes. It 
is not unnatural for businesses to give 
primacy to business impacts, whereas 
public policy will treat such impacts as 
one factor among the mix that need to be 
taken into account. 
Different governments will also focus 
on different public policy prescriptions, 
depending on where they think the main 
pressure points are, and their assessment 
of what is within the art of the possible. 
For example, one government might 
at a particular point in time focus on 
customs facilitation, while another will 
seek to reduce the costs of doing business 
within the country or on improving 
consultation.
Notwithstanding the complexity which 
arises out of the different ways in which 
goals are framed and the heterogeneity of 
ambitions and experiences, it is possible 
to describe some common elements, and 
to illustrate through these an increased 
blending of trade policy and mechanisms 
to ensure the quality of domestic 
regulation (regulatory management).
The domestic context – good regulatory 
practice 
The dominant approach to regulatory 
management in domestic jurisdictions 
has its genesis in the work of the OECD 
in the 1990s, commencing with the 1995 
OECD Recommendation on Improving 
the Quality of Government Regulation 
and followed by the 1997 OECD Policy 
Recommendations on Regulatory 
Reform. The centerpiece of regulatory 
management was regulatory impact 
analysis (RIA), a systematic approach 
to the development of regulation. The 
US was the first mover, and the OECD’s 
approach to regulatory management was 
based on the US model. New Zealand was 
an early follower when it implemented an 
RIA regime in the late 1990s. Today, most 
OECD countries have implemented RIA 
regimes, along with other elements of 
regulatory management. 
The process of diffusion continued 
through APEC in particular, with a key 
initiative being the 2005 APEC–OECD 
Integrated Checklist on Regulatory 
Reform, and now some non-OECD APEC 
economies have implemented regulatory 
management practices, including 
regulatory impact analysis. The OECD 
has also continued both to refine its 
approach to regulatory management and 
its advocacy. Initiatives include the 2005 
OECD Guidelines for Regulatory Quality 
and Performance, and, most recently, 
the 2012 OECD Recommendation on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance. 
In 2011 APEC leaders committed 
to taking ‘specific steps by 2013 to 
implement good regulatory practices in 
our economies, including by ensuring 
internal coordination of regulatory 
work; assessing regulatory impacts; and 
conducting public consultation’.3 APEC’s 
2014 Economic Policy Report will focus on 
good regulatory practices. 
In 2011 APEC leaders committed to taking 
‘specific steps by 2013 to implement good 
regulatory practices in our economies, including 
by ensuring internal coordination of regulatory 
work; assessing regulatory impacts; and 
conducting public consultation’.
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Evolutions or adaptations have also 
taken place within countries. In New 
Zealand these have included scanning 
and planning, best regulatory practice 
principles and performance indicators, 
and, more recently, stewardship 
requirements.4
At the most basic level, regulatory 
management requires countries to 
maintain robust and transparent 
processes and supporting governance 
arrangements (such as clear government 
expectations and oversight bodies) to 
provide an assurance that both new 
and existing regulation is efficient and 
effective. Regulatory impact analysis is 
a key feature of regulatory management 
and incorporates other features such 
as evidence-based policy, effective 
consultation, and risk and cost-benefit 
analysis. Collectively the strategies and 
tools for regulatory management are 
known as good regulatory practice 
(GRP).
Good regulatory practice in an international 
context
Partial elements of GRP can be found in 
existing international agreements. For 
example, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade includes a provision that:
technical regulations shall not be 
more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfillment 
would create. … In assessing 
such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available 
scientific and technical information, 
related processing technology or 
intended end-uses of products. 
(Article 2.2)
Elements of GRP can also be found 
in the domestic regulation provisions in 
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, including the following: 
With a view to ensuring that 
measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing 
requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services, the Council for Trade in 
Services shall, through appropriate 
bodies it may establish, develop any 
necessary disciplines. Such disciplines 
shall aim to ensure that such 
requirements are, inter alia:
(a) based on objective and 
transparent criteria, such as 
competence and the ability to 
supply the service;
(b) not more burdensome than 
necessary to ensure the quality of 
the service;
(c) in the case of licensing 
procedures, not in themselves a 
restriction on the supply of the 
service. (Article VI (4))
Until such time as these disciplines 
are developed, WTO parties are required 
to observe such requirements, to the 
extent that could be reasonably expected, 
in a way that does not nullify or impair 
market access commitments made under 
the agreement (article VI (5a)). 
Such provisions, with their emphasis 
on least-cost regulation and evidence-
based policy, are features of GRP but do 
not represent a complete system. In fact, 
one commentator has noted: ‘In practice, 
however, the objectives of domestic 
regulation and international trade have 
been difficult to reconcile. WTO rules 
are effective in limiting discriminatory 
regulatory measures, but have done 
little to eliminate the inefficient, unclear, 
redundant but non-discriminatory 
regulations that hinder international 
trade’ (Bollyky, 2012, p.173). 
There are at least two known examples 
of more comprehensive GRP provisions 
in regional and bilateral contexts:5
•	 The	1996	Trans-Tasman	Mutual	
Recognition	Arrangement	(TTMRA),	
which provides that: ‘Standards for 
Goods and Occupations may be 
determined	by	Ministerial	Councils	
under the terms of the Arrangement. 
Such determinations will be governed 
by the Principles and Guidelines for 
Standard Setting and Regulatory 
Action by Ministerial Councils and 
Standard-Setting Bodies endorsed 
by the Council of Australian 
Governments in April 1995.’ These 
are in effect GRP guidelines.
•	 The	introduction	of	an	RIA	regime	
for European Union legislation in 
2002. 
The	 TTMRA,	 as	 an	 arrangement	
within the framework of the Australia–
New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement (CER), and the 
European Union RIA requirement can be 
regarded as special cases, as CER and the 
EU are the most comprehensive economic 
partnerships in the world. 
The proposition in this article is that 
GRP is assuming more prominence in trade 
policy generally as a means of achieving 
regulatory coherence.6 Currently, the 
clearest evidence of this can be found in 
the report of the United States–European 
Union High Level Working Group on 
Jobs and Growth, which set the scene for 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership currently being negotiated, 
and the Bipartisan Congressional Trade 
Learning from Regulatory Disasters
RISs will normally contain:
•	 A	description	of	existing	arrangements	and	the	status	quo	(base	case	in	the	
absence of further government intervention);
•	 A	problem	definition;
•	 Objectives;
•	 Options:	identification	of	the	full	range	of	practical	options;
•	 An	 impact	 analysis:	 analysis	 of	 the	 costs	 (or	 possible	 economic	 losses),	
benefits and risks of options, with quantification (to the extent possible);
•	 Consultation	undertaken;
•	 Conclusions	and	recommendations;
•	 Implementation	plans	and	risks;	
•	 Likely	levels	of	compliance	and	enforcement;	and
•	 Arrangements	for	monitoring,	evaluation	and	review
(drawn from NZ CabGuide)
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Priorities Act of 2014, containing the 
principal negotiating objectives for the 
United States in the context of the Trade 
Promotion Authority. The current TPA, 
given to the president pursuant to the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities 
Act of 2002, has expired, and the 2014 act 
has not yet passed, but the negotiating 
objectives in the latter will nonetheless be 
significant in congressional consideration 
of the TPP and in the development of the 
TTIP. 
In a section on regulatory issues 
and non-tariff barriers, the High Level 
Working Group notes that: 
A significant portion of the benefit 
of a potential transatlantic agreement 
turns on the ability of the United 
States and EU to pursue new and 
innovative approaches to reduce 
the adverse impact on trade and 
investment of non-tariff barriers, 
with the aim of moving progressively 
toward a more integrated 
transatlantic marketplace. 
It recommends that the two sides 
should seek to negotiate (inter alia): 
Cross-cutting disciplines on 
regulatory coherence and 
transparency for the development 
and implementation of efficient, 
cost-effective, and more compatible 
regulations for goods and services, 
including early consultations on 
significant regulations, use of impact 
assessments, periodic review of 
existing regulatory measures, and 
application of good regulatory 
practices. (High Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth, 2013)
In fact, the Council of the European 
Union’s ‘Directives for the negotiation on 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership’ has recently been declassified, 
and in the section on regulatory coherence 
confirms that: 
The Agreement will include cross-
cutting disciplines on regulatory 
coherence and transparency for the 
development and implementation 
of efficient, cost-effective, and more 
compatible regulations for goods and 
services, including early consultations 
on significant regulations, use of 
impact assessments, evaluations, 
periodic review of existing regulatory 
measures, and application of good 
regulatory practices.7
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act 
of 2002 (US Code 3802)
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities 
Act of 2014 (HR 3830), pp.19-21
REGULATORY PRACTICES – The 
principal negotiating objectives of the 
United States regarding the use of 
government regulation or other practices 
by foreign governments to provide a 
competitive advantage to their domestic 
producers, service providers, or investors 
and thereby reduce market access for 
United States goods, services, and 
investments are – 
(a) to achieve increased transparency 
and opportunity for the participation 
of affected parties in the development 
of regulations;
(b) to require that proposed regulations 
be based on sound science, cost-
benefit analysis, risk assessment, or 
other objective evidence;
(c) to establish consultative mechanisms 
among parties to trade agreements 
to promote increased transparency 
in developing guidelines, rules, 
regulations, and laws for government 
procurement and other regulatory 
regimes
REGULATORY PRACTICES – The 
principal negotiating objectives of the 
United States regarding the use of 
government regulation or other practices 
to reduce market access for United States 
goods, services, and investments are – 
(a) to achieve increased transparency 
and opportunity for the participation 
of affected parties in the development 
of regulations; 
(b) to require that proposed regulations 
be based on sound science, cost-
benefit analysis, risk assessment, or 
other objective evidence;
(c) to establish consultative 
mechanisms and seek other 
commitments, as appropriate, 
to improve regulatory practices 
and promote increased regulatory 
coherence, including through — 
(i) transparency in developing 
guidelines, rules, regulations, and 
laws for government procurement 
and other regulatory regimes; (ii) 
the elimination of redundancies 
in testing and certification; (iii) 
early consultations on significant 
regulations; (iv) the use of impact 
assessments; (v) the periodic review 
of existing regulatory measures; and 
(vi) the application of good regulatory 
practices;
(d) to seek greater openness, 
transparency, and convergence of 
standards-development processes, 
and enhance cooperation on 
standards issues globally; 
(e) to promote regulatory compatibility 
through harmonization, equivalence, 
or mutual recognition of different 
regulations and standards and to 
encourage the use of international 
and interoperable standards, as 
appropriate
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In the case of the US, if we compare 
the 2002 and 2014 acts it can be seen 
that in the corresponding sections on 
regulatory practices, paragraph C in 
particular has significantly elaborated on 
the scope of good regulatory practices 
(as well as including a catch-all ‘good 
regulatory practices’ clause). Notable in 
both the EU documents and the 2014 
act are references to the use of impact 
assessments and reviews of existing 
regulation. 
The relationship between GRP and 
regulatory cooperation 
GRP in the form of regulatory impact 
analysis and reviews of existing 
regulation, with its associated elements 
such as risk and cost-benefit analysis, 
evidence-based policy, transparency 
and consultation, is not, of course, the 
only pathway to regulatory coherence. 
Regulatory cooperation, which can take 
the form of harmonisation, mutual 
recognition, equivalence, cooperation 
between regulators, policy coordination 
and unilateral alignment or recognition of 
standards that apply in other countries, is 
a familiar approach which deals explicitly 
with differences between the regulatory 
requirements of different countries (and 
echoes paragraph (E) in the Bipartisan 
Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 
2014). One commentator has described 
the relationship as follows:
Regulatory coherence is likely to 
consist of a number of mechanisms, 
including mutual recognition 
agreements in which officials on 
each side agree to accept products 
or services for the other side based 
on a ‘tested once’ criterion of 
specific sectors and products. Where 
harmonization or mutual recognition 
of existing regulations and standards 
cannot be achieved, then the TTIP 
seeks to create other forward-looking 
mechanisms to head off conflicts, 
including early consultations, impact 
assessments and regulatory reviews. 
(Hamilton, 2014, p.93)
Hamilton may be correct that GRP 
elements such consultations, impact 
assessments and regulatory reviews are 
sometimes seen as an easier alternative 
to formal regulatory cooperation such as 
harmonisation and mutual recognition. 
However, it is equally plausible that GRP 
is an end in itself. Specifically, the benefits 
of GRP in a trade policy context can 
accrue from:
•	 more	effective	and	efficient	domestic	
regulatory systems: i.e. systems that 
achieve their primary objectives 
while keeping regulatory costs as low 
as possible;
•	 assessments	of	both	new	regulatory	
proposals and existing regulation 
that explicitly take trade openness 
objectives	into	account	(Morrall,	
2011) and consider options 
that facilitate trade; these could 
include the unilateral adoption 
of international standards or 
standards that are commonly used in 
international trade, or provision for 
formal cooperation mechanisms;
•	 more	consultative	processes	for	the	
development of new regulation or 
the review of existing regulation, 
which means that interested groups 
in other countries can participate 
and bring their perspectives to bear 
in what are normally domestic policy 
processes;
•	 greater	transparency	and	engagement	
by regulators, which may result 
in better trust and understanding 
between regulators of the same goods 
or services in different jurisdictions 
of the regulatory approach taken 
by the other, paving the way for 
greater cooperation, acceptance of 
the standards that apply in the other 
jurisdiction, and potentially ‘mutual 
recognition of compatible regulatory 
regimes’ (ibid, p.i);8 
•	 greater	transparency	and	certainty	for	
those wishing to enter or operating 
in a market about the regulatory 
requirements they face (von Lamp 
and Jeong, 2013).
conclusion
Regulatory coherence has become a term 
of art for domestic regulatory systems 
which interface as seamlessly as possible 
with the systems of other countries, 
but what it means in practice can only 
really be understood with reference to 
the practices that accompany it. Some of 
these are common features of trade policy 
agendas, such as regulatory cooperation, 
transparency and the adoption of least 
trade restrictive regulatory measures. 
Others are less known in trade policy 
contexts, but are commonly adopted 
as elements of domestic regulatory 
management. These can be grouped under 
the general heading of good regulatory 
practice. A particularly significant element 
is regulatory impact analysis, with 
systematic reviews of existing regulation 
emerging as a new element with equal 
significance. 
Good regulatory practice has been 
promoted in international forums such as 
APEC for some time, but, with a limited 
number of exceptions, it has not been 
formally part of trade policy agendas. 
This is now changing. It is less clear 
where this will end up. Will there be joint 
trans-national regulatory impact analysis 
as recommended by one commentator 
in	 a	 TTIP	 context	 (Morrall,	 2011),	 or	
will GRP retain its current status as 
‘best practice’ rather than being formally 
mandated in trade agreements? 
In my view, GRP is likely to retain 
its status as best practice, with a strong 
normative presumption that modern 
regulatory states embed GRP, including 
regulatory impact analysis and reviews 
of existing regulation, in their regulatory 
management systems. However, it is also 
likely that regulatory coherence as an 
outcome will become a more explicit 
objective when countries examine the 
impacts of new regulatory proposals and 
existing regulation, and the regulatory 
impact analysis process, which is 
inherently public, will make these impacts 
more transparent.
1 It should be noted that regulation may be excessive at the 
national level with commensurate costs to those who trade 
within those markets. However, regulation can be efficient 
at the national level but still impose costs for firms operating 
across multiple markets simply because the requirements 
they need to meet are different.
2	 This	definition	was	first	presented	at	an	APEC	workshop	
on regulatory coherence (Moscow, 2012) and is now 
incorporated into a guide being developed by the Ministry 
of Business, Innovation and Employment on ‘Regulatory co-
operation	in	APEC	within	the	framework	of	FTAs’.	
3 The Honolulu Declaration: Toward a Seamless Regional 
Economy, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-
Declarations/2011/2011_aelm.aspx.
4 See http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/regulation.
5 The Agreement between New Zealand and the Separate 
Customs	Territory	of	Taiwan,	Penghu,	Kinmen,	and	Matsu	
on	Economic	Cooperation	has	an	objective	to:	‘encourage	
the use of good regulatory practices (as set out in Annex 
D (“Strengthening Implementation of Good Regulatory 
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Practices”)	of	the	2011	APEC	Leaders’	Declaration)	for	the	
planning, design, implementation and review of regulation” 
(article. 2.f). 
6 In addition to the examples used here, there are also 
interesting regulatory coherence-related developments in 
Latin America. There are outlined in Romero (2014).
7 http://www.access-info.org/documents/Access_Docs/
Advancing/EU/ST_11103_2013_DCL_1_EN.pdf,	
downloaded 20 October 2014.
8 Hoekman has, however, noted: ‘While such processes 
[consultation and information exchanges in relation to new 
regulatory measures] are important to building trust and 
understanding of the operation of counterpart regulatory 
processes and norms, their effect in lowering trade costs 
may be limited’ (Hoekman, 2013, p.29), suggesting that 
something in addition is required, such as using a supply 
chain approach to look across regulatory areas to identify 
the package of feasible measures that can be taken to 
facilitate trade and investment. That being said, the evidence 
for Hoekman’s conclusion on limited impacts was drawn 
from the EU-US experience and may be different for other 
jurisdictions. 
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Upcoming Events
Date Title speaker Venue
Monday 1 December
12.30pm – 1.30pm
Comparative Situations of Maori 
and First Nations in the US
Professor Alan Parker
Director, Northwest Indian Applied 
Research Institute
Victoria University of Wellington, 
Pipitea	Campus,	Old	Government	
Buildings (Law School) GBLT2
All Welcome – No RSVP’s required
Tuesday 2 December
5.30pm – 7.00pm 
Adding Public Value at the 
Interface Between Government 
and the Community: Achieving a 
strong customer and client focus
John Benington
Emeritus Professor, Warwick Business 
School
Russell McVeagh 
Boardroom 
RSVP Essential*
Wednesday 3 
December
12pm – 1.45pm
Public Managers and Political 
Astuteness: Lessons for the  
New Zealand State sector
Professor Jean Hartley
Department of Public Leadership and 
Social Enterprise, The Open University
Rydges Hotel
75 Featherston Street, Wellington
RSVP Essential*
*RSVP’s can be sent to igps@vuw.ac.nz
For further information on IGPS Events visit our website http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/
